Brief justifications:
RCV completely eliminates the Lesser-of-2-Evils problem (LO2E) for the Mutual-Majority (MM) …a group of voters defined below.
STAR-Voting, the proposal of the Equal-Vote organization, whose officers, in the pamphlet, claim it to be better than RCV, doesn’t achieve that for *anyone*. Yes, STAR, Approval, & Score mitigate LO2E, but likewise RCV mitigates it too, for the non-MM voters. …while completely eliminating it for the MM.
LO2E is also often called “the Spoiler-Problem”.
The Mutual-Majority (MM) is the majority-size group who all prefer some same set of candidates to all other candidates.
If the MM vote sincerely, RCV guarantees that the winner will be elected from their mutually-preferred set.
(There can be one MM inside another, in which case the above guarantee, applying to all MMs, of course applies to the innermost one too.)
That’s called the Mutual-Majority Criterion, or the Generalized Majority Criterion.
STAR fails it, as does Plurality.
Most people want what’s best for most people.
i.e. The progressives are the Mutual-Majority.
We can’t lose.
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Answers to objections in the Oregon ballot-pamphlet:
Equal-Vote claimed that RCV ignores most rankings. False. RCV doesn’t ignore any rankings. It counts them by the following rule:
Repeatedly eliminate the candidate who tops fewest rankings, till someone tops most of them.
[end of RCV count-rule]
So what did Equal-Vote mean? They meant that RCV doesn’t count every pairwise preference in every ballot. Well, the methods that do that are called Pairwise-Count methods, or Condorcet versions. Equal-Vote wants to fault RCV for not abiding by the rules of Condorcet.
Objectors who complain about eliminations or “exhausted-ballots” seem to be implying a procedural-criterion, a criterion about procedure. But it really only makes sense for a criterion to be about *results* All, or nearly all, voting-system criteria, such as the Mutual-Majority Criterion (MMC), LNHa, & Freedom-From-Chicken Dilemma (FCD) are results-criteria. (Those criteria are defined & described below.)
The very best Condorcet versions are excellent, but they’re infeasible because their humungously computation-intensive exhaustive pairwise-count invites & facilitates count-fraud.
Methods are to be evaluated by the guarantees that they offer. As mentioned above, RCV, but not STAR, meets the Mutual-Majority Criterion (MMC), also called the Generalized Majority-Criterion (GMC). STAR fails that criterion.
Because Equal-Vote wants to claim that STAR is better than RCV, let’s consider a few other criteria:
1. Freedom from Chicken-Dilemma (FCD):
Chicken-Dilemma happens when factions in a MM fear to support eachother’s candidate for fear that the other faction will take advantage of their support by not reciprocating it, & thereby beating them out of the win.
It can result in the MM failing to elect anyone.
STAR, Approval & Score have Chicken-Dilemma. RCV has no Chicken-Dilemma.
EqualVote claims that STAR doesn’t have the Split-Vote problem. STAR has the Split-Vote problem when there’s a Chicken-Dilemma.
Equal-Vote claims that STAR doesn’t have a Spoiler-Problem, & that RCV does. No, STAR mitigates that problem, & RCV mitigates it for the unfavored non-MM losers. …but RCV completely eliminates that problem for the MM.
2. Later-No-Harm (LNHa):
If you vote sincerely, your support for a candidate whom you like less should never help hir beat a candidate whom you like more.
RCV passes LNHa. The Cardinal-methods (STAR, Approval & Score) fail LNHa.
EqualVote, & other objectors, claim that RCV failed in Alaska, when it elected Peltola, with Palin as spoiler.
RCV didn’t fail, It elected from the MM’s mutually-preferred set, as it should, and as it always will. Palin’s voters weren’t in the MM. That wasn’t RCV’s fault. Maybe they just need to change their platform, to make it more popular.
Yes, in that election Palin was a spoiler. I don’t claim that RCV eliminates the Spoiler problem for everyone. Only for the MM.
The Spoiler problem can happen to the non-MM losers when the Condorcet-winner (CW) is eliminated. The CW is the candidate who pairbeats each one of the others (when there is such a candidate). But RCV, though it sometimes eliminates the CW (when the CW is the least-favorite candidate), that usually doesn’t happen.
Thus the Spoiler result for the non-MM losers won’t usually happen. The Spoiler problem is thus mitigated for them (& completely eliminated for the MM).
Likewise, RCV didn’t fail in Burlington, for the same reason.
EqualVote claimed that, just as RCV “flipped a seat from Red to Blue”, it could just as easily do the reverse. No, it wouldn’t.
As I said above, most people want what’s best for most people. Progressives can be briefly & broadly defined as those who want what’s best for most people. They’re the MM. The spoiler problem doesn’t happen to the MM, in RCV.
Why did the seat flip in Alaska? Evidently because the Palin voters thought that *everyone* had the guarantee of no Spoiler-Problem. No, that guarantee is only to the MM.
Had the Palin preferers used insincere defensive strategy, by insincerely top-ranking the likely CW in 1st place, they could have elected that CW, & gotten an outcome they prefer. But the MM voters don’t have that predicament.
Might progressives use that insincere defensive strategy to protect a likely CW, just in case they aren’t an MM? No.
For one thing, they aren’t enacting RCV so that they can bury their favorite under a lesser-evil. They can (& do) already do that in Plurality. No, they’re enacting RCV because they DON’t want to do that. They won’t bury Favorite under Lesser-Evil
Besides, they know that all evidence says that the progressives are the MM.
Besides, given that the CW probably won’t be eliminated, then; ranking hir below Favorite, but above Greater-Evil is significantly helping that Lesser-Evil (putatively the CW). In fact, it’s helping hir more than an evil deserves !!
If the CW is eliminated, hir voters will probably transfer their votes in the progressive direction, because the greater-evil is universally-disliked, & because the voter-median (where the CW is) is progressive. Therefore the progressives win.
Besides, because the progressives are the Mutual-Majority, the CW will be a progressive, NOT a lesser-evil. (The CW will be one of the MM’s mutually-preferred candidates.)
Those are reasons why progressives aren’t going to bury their favorite under a lesser-evil.
RCV won’t flip seats rightward in statewide or national elections.
So far this has been mostly about EqualVote’s objections. Now for the more frequent objections from others. Most republicans don’t like RCV, & for good reason: If you aren’t in the MM, it doesn’t favor you.
So it isn’t surprising that most Republicans oppose RCV. Actually, a lot of Democrats oppose it too, & for the same reason. If, as I claim, the progressives are the MM, that means that the Democrat’s are NOT in the MM-preferred candidate-set. Notice that the Democrat policy-statement in the Oregon ballot-pamphlet doesn’t include 117 among the measures that it endorses.
Some objectors say that several states have banned RCV. They’re Republican states. They know that they aren’t in the national MM.
Some objectors say that Alaska is trying to repeal RCV. WRONG. The *losing side* in that Alaska election is trying to repeal RCV. We hear similar claims about other places where RCV was repealed or attemptedly-repealed. …by the people on the wrong end of RCV’s majoritarian property.
Burlington re-enacted RCV.
In general, voters are happy with RCV.
Many objectors say that RCV can fail to elect a candidate who is favorite of a majority. Bullshit.
Because RCV meets the Mutual-Majority Criterion (MMC), it also meets the Majority-Criterion (MC). As I said, every method that meets MMC meets MC.
(MC says that a favorite of a majority must win if that majority vote sincerely.)
Some object that RCV’s winner isn’t always the favorite of a majority. Of course not, but only because there often or usually is no such candidate. When there is, RCV elects hir.
Some say that setting up & administering RCV is too expensive. Oh really?:
According to the official estimate in the ballot pamphlet, RCV will cost about 66 cents per year for each person in Oregon,. Do you think we can handle that? :-D
Even if there’s a 5-fold cost-overrun, then RCV would cost $3.30 per person per year in Oregon.
So much for expense.
Additionally, progressives *want* RCV. That’s why it’s taking off all around the country, much more than any other voting-system reform. That’s why so many progressive parties & candidates are proposing & endorsing it.
Progressives are right to want RCV. RCV is the best proposal for our society & electoral-system. The Lesser-of-2-Evils problem is the problem in our society & electoral-system. Eliminating that problem for the MM would make all the difference. Can you imagine being able to rank candidates sincerely? …instead of holding your nose to vote for someone you don’t like?
Morning in America? Yes.
It should be pointed out that the EqualVote organization, who argue against RCV in the ballot-pamphlet arguments, have their own proposal (STAR voting). If RCV succeeds statewide, then EqualVote won’t be able to enact STAR statewide. That might have something to do with their ballot-pamphlet argument against RCV.
That sounds selfish, if an organization is attacking a popular reform proposal, opposing reform at a time when it’s badly-needed–to benefit their own proposal. (…but of course I can’t & shouldn’t assert what someone’s motivation is.)
There was an episode of the 3-Stooges in which two of them were trying to leave a room in a hurry. When one of them was going out the door, the other would pull him back & take his place trying to leave…only to be likewise pulled back by the other guy. …& so on, with the two of them preventing eachother from leaving, for a long time.
At the time, I thought that was fiction, It isn’t.
Many objectors claim that RCV forces people to rank all the candidates. Bullshit. A glance at the provided material shows that you can rank as few candidates as you want. If you want, you can support only one, voting exactly as you do now.
Many objectors claim that the RCV count rule is too complicated, Above, I told a brief statement of its count-rule: “Repeatedly eliminate the candidate who tops fewest rankings, till someone tops most of them.”
Many objectors claim that the RCV count can’t be done without using a computer. Nonsense, Australia & Ireland were using RCV long before there were any computers. They’ve been using it for about a century.
Plurality is counted by computer. Neither it nor RCV need be computer-counted.
Many objectors claim that RCV’s count is so computation-intensive that it will be impossible to hand-audit. Bullshit. RCV doesn’t require any more vote-counting than Approval voting (…the variation on Plurality that allows voters to indicate approval for as many candidates as they want to).
Many objectors claim that, unlike Plurality & STAR, RCV fails “Precinct Summability”….that, unlike Plurality & STAR, RCV requires counting at a central location. Nonsense.
Every voting system requires the following 4 things:
- Counting at the precincts.
- Those count results sent in to Count-Central.
- A summation & comparison done at Count-Central.
- Reporting from Count-Central.
Plurality, Approval & Score require that.
STAR requires two rounds of that, with Score’s added complication from the 0-5 point-system.
RCV requires several rounds of single-vote counting.
If it can be securely done twice, with the complication of the 0-5 point-system, then it can be securely done several times counting single-votes. No, it isn’t prohibitive or excessive like a Condorcet-count.
Some objectors say that RCV is untested. …yeah only in many U.S. cities, currently & historically, and in two U.S. states, and in Australia and Ireland for about a century. Also, in the *large* electorate of India, and in Papua-New-Guinea and in Fiji.
RCV is liked in the places where it’s used.
Except in Republican states, because (as I said), Republicans aren’t in the national Mutual-Majority. Besides, a Republican state-legislature doesn’t necessarily mean a Republican electorate, given gerrymandering, minority-voter-purges, etc.
Objectors mention that RCV was repealed a lot in the ‘20s. Yeah, when it was noticed that it was electing racial-minorities & Socialists.
Some objectors claim that there’s no need to replace Plurality because there’s nothing wrong with Plurality. Hello??? Ever heard of the Lesser-Evil-Problem? …people feeling dismally compelled to hold their nose to vote for someone they don’t like, instead of for the person & policies that they want.
Plurality’s Lesser-Of-2-Evils problem is very widely recognized & criticized by American voters.
Some objectors wax emotional about votes being transferred to candidates without the voter’s permission or knowledge :-D
Pure nonsense.
The transfers are what the voter intends when they rank lower choices. That’s the point ranking lower choices.
Some objectors say that there are spoiled ballots, disproportionately in some population-sectors. One objector estimated 20% of ballots spoiled.
For one thing, when something is new to a particular person, that person might not initially know how to do it, but then finds out. When the bicycle was invented, was it banned because riding-skills weren’t already universal?
20% of ballots spoiled? How about *most* ballots ruined by the need to hold one’s nose & vote an evil over what one actually wants?
Anyway, I claim that there’s no need to call a ballot “spoiled” or throw it out because someone marked 2 candidates at the same rank, or marked a candidate at 2 ranks:
1. If someone marks 2 candidates at the same rank:
S/he didn’t say, & maybe doesn’t care, which is counted over the other. So just rank them in alphabetical-order, by surname. It’s that voter’s vote, & s/he doesn’t care which is ranked over the other on hir ballot.
If it was an error, then the voter would obviously rather have them ranked in random-order than have hir ballot thrown-out.
2. If someone marks a candidate at 2 rank-positions:
Average (arithmetical-mean) the rank-numbers at which s/he marked the candidate. Round off to the nearest whole number, and that’s the rank number given to that candidate on that ballot.
Obviously the arithmetical-mean of two integers will end with .5 That’s ambiguous to round. Well, given that there’s no information that the voter prefers rounding up or down, then either would do. If the arithmetical-mean is ambiguous, due to the .5, then use the *geometric-mean*. The geometric mean of two positive integers is always less than their arithmetical-mean. So round the rank-number down. …which means that the candidate’s rank is moved up to the better of the two integers that bound the number ending in .5
Again, that’s the best guess for what that voter wanted. Surely s/he meant for it to be one of those two rank-numbers, & so surely s/he’d rather use their average (arithmetical if possible, otherwise geometric).
So there’s no reason to throw out an accidentally “spoiled” ballot in RCV.
(Condorcet allows equal-ranking of 2 or more candidates, but that would spoil RCV’s properties.)
Some objectors complain that the state legislature didn’t include itself in the proposed system-change and criticize the referendum on that basis.
Well, there’s a good reason to not include the legislature: There are two bills in the legislature for two kinds of proportional-representation. So, the legislature’s intent is probably to offer RCV for all single-seat offices (including U.S. president), but to offer proportional-representation for the state-legislature. That sounds to me like a good idea. …not a basis for complaint.
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