In a previous article, I’ve discussed how conditions relating to voting-system choice will be different in a Green America. But that was some time ago, and so let me revisit the topic. Because the matter of what voting systems are adequate or excellent depends on the conditions under which they’re to be used, I speak of two different condition-states for official political elections: Current conditions, and the Green scenario.
Current Conditions:
We have dishonest, disinformational media and a public most of whom believe whatever those media say. In particular, the media have convinced nearly everyone that only a Democrat or a Republican can ever win, and that the Democrats and the Republican are “The Two Choices”. In fact, by a total or near-total blackout on any mention of a party other than Democrat or Republican, or any policy proposals other than those of those 2 parties, our media, including such pseudo-progressive outlets as NPR and PBS, strongly imply that no parties exist other than the Democrats and Republicans, and no policy proposals exist, other than theirs.
When voters (even if mistakenly) believe that the winner must be one of a particular two parties, then, in those voters’ perception, it becomes essential to do everything possible to help the better of those two parties. That’s why, in our current Plurality (Vote-For-1) voting system, progressives typically say that they must pragmatically hold their nose and vote for the Democrat. Pitiable resigned demoralization characterizes voting under current conditions. So, as we all know, that perceived need to help the Democrat at all costs implies a need to abandon one’s actual favorite. That’s why, under current conditions, a voting system that can give incentive to abandon one’s favorite is entirely inadequate. As I’ve discussed before, that favorite-burial need makes nonsense of an election-result.
Therefore, for current conditions, I recommend Approval and Score (the familiar points-rating system), because they never give incentive to abandon one’s favorite. With Approval and Score, there’s never any reason not to give top rating to one’s favorite. There are some excellent rank-balloting methods that share that desirable property (ICT and Symmetrical ICT). But Approval and Score are much more feasible and enactable proposals, under our current government.
But I suggest that, under our current Republocrat government, there isn’t going to be any voting-system reform. After all, why would incumbents, and their owners and bribers, want to replace the Plurality voting system that’s working so well for them? So I suggest that it ain’t gonna happen. I suggest that the only way any improvement or reform can happen will be by electing a different and better kind of people to the presidency and most of Congress (and state legislatures too). That might sound ambitious, but I suggest that it’s a lot more feasible, and easier, than achieving voting-system reform under the Republocrat government.
Why do I claim that it’s easier? Well, voting system reform, for national office, would require enactment by incumbents, or prohibitively expensive and difficult state initiatives. In contradistinction, electing a better party to office would require nothing other than voting for them, in the official public elections that we already have. You and I could easily do our part to achieve that—in the next election. So let’s do so.
And how would we do that? Well, when there are unacceptable candidates who could win (as of course is now the case), then the optimal strategy of our Plurality (Vote-For-1) voting system is to combine our votes on the most winnable acceptable candidate. For progressives (people who want government to be more humane and egalitarian, and to be honest and uncorrupt for a change), that means combining our votes on the most winnable progressive.
It’s clear to me that the most winnable progressive, in any of our elections, will be the nominee of the Green Party of the U.S. (GPUS). So, what can we do to improve our country? Vote Green. I suggest that if Americans looked at some party platforms, and voted in their own best interest, then the transition to a Green America would begin in 2014, and would be complete in 2016.
If we merely vote honestly, for what we want, that could happen immediately.
The Green Scenario:
So, with a Green government, what would voting be like? The Greens offer Instant Runoff (IRV) as the voting system. Because I claim that election of the Greens is the only way that voting system reform will happen, then I also claim that IRV will be the next voting system.
Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) definition:
Repeatedly, cross off or delete from the rankings the candidate who tops the fewest rankings. Of course, the last-remaining un-crossed-off candidate wins.
Though IRV isn’t adequate for current conditions, because media disinformation can induce favorite-burial, things will be quite different in the Green scenario. For one thing, any electorate that could elect the Greens to office under Plurality must be an electorate who are no longer deceived by the media, and who are voting honestly—an electorate who aren’t persuaded to abandon what they want. Therefore, favorite-burial incentive is no longer a problem, and IRV becomes a fine voting system.
For another thing, in a Green America, the media would be vastly more open, free, participatory, and agenda-free. There would be in effect no media disinformation. For those two reasons, there would no longer be any media-induced perception of need for favorite-burial, and so IRV would become an adequate voting system—in fact, IRV would become an excellent voting system, in the Green scenario.
Though I’ve discussed this before (in IRV Revisited), let’s consider IRV’s desirable properties. I’ll name some of them, and then define some of them afterwards:
- Mutual Majority Criterion
- Later-No-Harm Criterion
- no chicken dilemma
- Later-No-Help Criterion
- Clone Independence Criterion
A mutual majority (MM) is a set of voters who comprise a majority of the voters, and who all prefer a certain same set of candidates to all of the other candidates. That set of candidates is that MM’s “MM-preferred set”.
Definition of the Mutual Majority Criterion:
A mutual majority (MM) is a set of voters, comprising a majority of the voters, who all prefer a certain same set of alternatives to all of the other alternatives. That set of alternatives is their MM-preferred set. If a MM vote sincerely, then the winner should come from their MM-preferred set.
Definition of the Chicken Dilemma:
Say your faction prefer A, and another faction prefer B. Your 2 factions, combined are a majority, and both detest C, strongly preferring A and B to C. The A voters help B, but the B voters don’t help A. Though the A voters are more numerous than the B voters, B wins, because the B voters took advantage of the A voters’ co-operativeness.
Suppose that there are two factions, adding up to a majority of the voters. The members of both factions prefer both factions’ candidates to the other candidates, whom they all despise.
But maybe both factions fear that if they support the other faction, then the other faction can, by failing to reciprocate that support, take advantage of that one-sided co-operation in order to win. Each faction is afraid of being taken advantage of the other if it co-operates. The message is “You help, you lose”. Under those conditions, a mutual majority might not vote as a mutual majority, and MMC compliance loses its meaning and value.
So, IRV’s powerful combination of properties is this: It complies with MMC, and it doesn’t have a chicken dilemma. IRV’s compliance with Later-No-Harm guarantees that there can be no chicken dilemma. I’ve defined Later-No-Harm elsewhere, but, briefly, in a rank method, it means that adding more candidates to your ranking can’t hurt the chances of anyone you rank above those newly-ranked candidates. Very few methods meet Later-No-Harm, and IRV is one of those few.
Compliance with MMC, and complete freedom from chicken dilemma mean that, in IRV, a mutual majority (MM) have no need to do other than rank sincerely. That freedom from strategy need is an ideal that is rarely attainable in voting systems, but IRV offers it, for a MM. A MM can easily assure that the winner will come from its MM-preferred set, while also freely choosing among that MM-preferred set, by ranking sincerely.
Therefore, I suggest that the Greens’ choice of IRV, as the voting system to offer in their platform is an excellent choice, for the Green scenario. Could IRV be improved upon? Sure, in some ways: A Condorcet winner (CW) is a candidate who pairwise-beats each one of the other candidates, where X pairwise-beats Y if more voters rank X over Y than rank Y over X. A CW, when there is one (and there usually is one) is the natural compromise. Electing the CW guarantees that there won’t be any dis-satisfied majority.
As I said above, IRV guarantees complete freedom from strategy-need, for a mutual majority (MM). A MM is the really important majority. Most voters probably believe that they’re in a MM, especially if they actually are. IRV favors MMs, but why shouldn’t it? What’s wrong with government by a cohesive majority? But IRV can eliminate a CW, and, thereby, dis-satisfy a differently-constituted majority. As perfect as it is for that most important majority, a mutual majority, IRV can dis-satisfy another majority. The CW will be a member of the MM-preferred set. If the CW gets eliminated in IRV (and a different member of the MM-preferred set wins), then the preferrers of the CW could side with the non-MM voters, as a dis-satisfied majority who could, by majority vote, replace IRV with a method that better elects CWs.
I suggest that, if we elect a Green government, then the Greens will be the CW in the elections. If their candidates get eliminated in IRV, then, as described above, a dis-satisfied majority could vote to replace IRV with a method that better elects CWs. Therefore, if there were an IRV-like method that always elected CWs, it would be more stable, in the sense of not being vulnerable to replacement by a dis-satisfied majority. When the CW is elected, there can’t be a dis-satisfied majority.
Another reason why a CW-electing IRV-like method could be desirable would be because: What if you aren’t in a mutual majority? The greater compromising-ness of a CW-electing method offers an assurance even for non-MM voters. And there are IRV-like methods that always elect the CW when there is one. Let me describe a few.
Definition of Benham’s method (also called “Benham” or “Condorcet-IRV”):
Do IRV until there is an un-eliminated alternative that beats each of the other un-eliminated alternatives. Elect hir.
Not only does Benham always elect the CW when there is one, but it also always chooses from the Smith set. In other words, it meets the “Smith Criterion”.
Smith set definition:
The Smith set is the smallest set of candidates who all pairwise-beat everyone outside that set.
Smith Criterion definition:
The winner should come from the Smith set.
Benham’s definition is neatly brief, and doesn’t even have to contain a definition or mention of the Smith set. But there’s another method, that is more particular about which Smith-set member it chooses. That allows that other method to achieve slightly better “social utility” than Benham, at the cost of a slightly wordier definition, because its definition must mention the Smith set:
Definition of Woodall Method:
Do IRV till only one member of the initial Smith set remains un-eliminated. Elect hir.
Benham and Woodall are both excellent voting systems. They share IRV’s powerful combination of properties: Compliance with the Mutual Majority Criterion (MMC), and freedom from the chicken dilemma. Few methods have those properties. And, additionally, Benham and Woodall always elect the CW when there is one. In fact, even when there isn’t a CW, Benham and Woodall always choose from the Smith set. Here’s the URL of a journal article about Benham and Woodall (and a few other Condorcet IRV hybrids), written by James Green Armytage.
To summarize, in the Green scenario, IRV (which is what is offered in the Green platform) would be an excellent method, due to the properties described above. But Benham or Woodall would better avoid dis-satisfied majorities, avoiding IRV’s possible vulnerability to replacement by a more CW-electing method. Additionally, Benham and Woodall offer an assurance for non-MM voters as well.
If, in the Green scenario, IRV gets replaced by Benham or Woodall, that would be fine. If IRV doesn’t get replaced, but is kept, that would be fine too. They’re all fine voting systems for the Green scenario. Though I support voting-system reform efforts, I believe that electing the Greens, encouraging people to vote for the Greens, has a far better chance of success than voting system reform efforts under the current (Republocrat) government.
END
Visit the Michael Ossipoff page at Democracy Chronicles to see his other work including Occupy’s Exit Poll Shows Green Outperforming Republican.
Michael Ossipoff says
Camelia said:
[quote]
Your video loses me when you say It’s not my’ video.
[/quote]
Sorry, but it really isn’t my video. I haven’t published or posted a
video. I have no idea what video you’re referring to. You’ve confused
me with someone else.
[quote]
Perhaps I have not thought things through
[/quote]
Well, you certainly should be sure that you’re talking to the person
that you think you’re talking to.
And, if you want to contradict what i’ve been saying about IRV, then
you need to actually read it, and tell, specifically, why you disagree
with specific statments and claims that I make.
[quote]
There are better election systems out there then plurality and IRV though!
[/quote]
Emphatic, but vague. I’ve clarified under what specific conditons IRV
would be good. And, for those conditions, I’ve discussed Woodall’s
method and Benham’s method too, and recommended them as probably a
better choice than iRV.
As I said, if you want to express disagreement with my article, then
you need to actually read it, and then share with us exactly which of
my statements or claims you disagree with, and then give reasons to
justsify your statement of disagreement.
I’ve told what big advantages IRV has for Green scenario conditions. I
stand by those statements. If you want to find my answers to your
objections to IRV, then I recommend that you read my article with
which you’re disagreeing.
But no, I’m not going to repeat it all for you.
[quote]
I personally favor approval voting or very low granularity range voting.
[/quote]
I recommended those methods for current conditions. I’ve been doing so
since my firsts Democracy Chronicles article,.
To understand why I, instead, recommend IRV, Benham, or Woodall for
Green scenario conditions, you’d need to actually read the article to
which you’re commenting.
[quote]
As for IRV vs. plurality w/ a runoff when a candidate did not get a
majority in the first election: Neither is especially appealing. If
the choice is solely between these options I prefer the actual runoff.
[/quote]
I specified some important desirable properties of IRV, Benham, and
Woodall. Read the article.
Runoff doesn’t have those properties.
[quote]
The election integrity properties of IRV are very poor. To count the
ballots requires central counting or central coordination which means
that fraud can be centralized. There is no such thing as a precinct
level count with IRV!
[/quote]
You’re parroting what you’ve heard. I’ve thoroughly answered those
erroneous complaints in my articles. As I said, there’s no need to
repeat all of it every time someone disregards it.
[quote]
(technically such counts exist but they explode exponentially as a
function of the number of candidates)
[/quote]
Nonsense. An IRV count, with N candidates, pretty much amounts to N
Plurality counts. There’s no reason why IRV’s separate counts, for
each elimination stage, need be any less secure than a Plurality
count. But I’m repeating myself, and there’s really no need for me to
do that. I refer you to my articles.
Michael Ossipoff says
Just a little clarification regarding my reply this morning:
I said that an IRV count, with candidates, pretty much amounts to N Plurality counts. That’s right, as regards the publishing of count results, and almost right, as regards the amount of work. I said “pretty much”, because IRV adds a little extra work to the N Plurality counts, because, in a handcount, when the central count location has counted the vote totals (as must be done in Plurality, Approval and Range too), and reported the candidate with lowest vote total (the one who is to be eliminated), then, at each precinct, it’s necessary to do the additional work of finding that candidate in the list of candidates, and crossing hir off. That’s easier than the vote-counting that an iRV round has in common with a Plurality count, but it does increase one of the count-labor terms by a factor of N.
As I said, as far as the publishing of count results, local and central, is concerned, an N-candidate IRV count is no different from N Plurality counts, and is NO LESS SECURE.
In one of my more recent articles, I spoke of public imaging of ballots, as a way of making machine-balloting and computer-counting perfectly secure and fraud-proof.
I probably shouldn’t repeat what I’ve already written, but should instead just refer you to it, but this time I’ll repeat it:
A machine-balloting and computer-count, for any voting system, including any rank-method, including IRV, can be made completely secure as follows:
The voter could indicate hir ranking via touchscreen, Marksense (with which the voter would feed hir ballot into the voting-machine), or whatever method, or just by writng on paper. If the balloting is machine balloting, by touchscreen, Marksense, etc., then the voting machine outputs, for the voter, a printed ranking. The voter folds it and puts it into a traditional ballot-box.
At the precinct counting-place, observers, official and unofficial, of a variety of politicsl parties, across the political spectrum, are present to observe the count, and image the ballots.
One at a time, each ballot is laid face up on a table. There are digital cameras, owned, set up and controlled by, each of the observer political parties. There’s also one that is the official precinct imaging camera.
As each ballot is, one at a time, laid face-up on the table, it is imaged by each of those cameras.
But, before the imaging, each ballot is stamped with a consecutive order-number. The imaging is then done, so that the ballot i imaged with its consecutive ordering-number.
The ballots, of course, are securely transported to a secure strorage room, where they’re protected by locks, cameras, and alarms, belonging to the various observer parties.
Of course there’s no reason why any two parties’ ballot-image-sets should differ. If there’s one that differs from the others, then it’s very likely to be the one that is wrong. But if there is any disagreement about any of the ballots in the official precinct ballot-image-set, then of course whichever party has that disagreement has only to specify _which_ ballot, identified by its consecutive order-number, is the incorrect one.
Then, the matter is easily settled by a public examination and re-imaging of the ballot in question.
That’s done at the precincts.
With any voting system, including Plurality, Approval, Score (Range), IRV, Benham, and Woodall, of course it’s necessary for the precinct results to be sent to the national central count. They aren’t sent privately. They’re published and broadcast. That’s true whether it’s a handcount, or computer-count.
So the central count location then has all of the ballots, digitally. Each ballot set, from each precinct has been published, broadcast, and archived, in digital form, and securely stored, in original physical paper form.
That doesn’t leave room for fraud at the national count level either.
The system of public imaging, with the observer parties, would work just as well, and just as reliably, at the national central count.
I mention this public imaging procedure to show that there needn’t be anything insecure about a machine-balloting with computer-count.
Obviously that system could work fine in a national direct popular-vote presidential election.
But I’m not saying that there has to be a national presidential election.
For one thing, we don’t need the presidential system. I prefer the parliamentary system. As I’ve already described, members of Parliament would be elected in their local districts. They, in Parliament, would choose government officers, including a Prime Minister. (I like the idea of that Prime-Minister having very little power, limited to emergencies and other situations where there is no time to vote in Parliament).
For another thing, there have been perfectly feasible proposals for a bottom-up election system in which people at the popular, local, level elect representatives to a next higher level (city or county). In a particular state, those elected to city or county level vote to elect state representatives. Then the state representatives vote to elect someone with national emergency decisionmaking responsibilities, and other national officials. Alternatively, the state representatives could instead elect a national parliament, who could elect the national government, as described above.
I have nothing against that bottom-up process, but the parliamentary system seems simpler. Either would be fine.
So there’s no need for a big national presidential election. But IRV, Benham, or Woodall would work fine in such an election, whether in a handcount (it would take longer than a Plurality count. It might take a few days. So what?), or in a machine-balloting, computer-counting public-imaging system.
As for details of the parliamentary or congressional elections and districting, I already covered that in one of my more recent articles, whose title referrred to better vote-counting. But I’ll just repeat that I recommend that districting be by Band-Rectangle districting, and that the voting in each district by by Woodall.
Benham would be next best.
Four national political parties offer IRV as their voting system proposal in their platforms. Those parties are:
1. Green Party US (GPUS)
2. Greens/ Green Party USA (G/GPUSA)
3. Socialist Party USA (SPUSA)
4. Reform Party
IRV is the only voting system (other than Plurality) offered in any party’s platform. That’s why its nice that IRV is a good voting system with the powerful desirable properties that I’ve described.
But I suggest that Woodall, or (secondarily) Benham, would be better, for the reasons that I’ve already described in my articles.
Michael Ossipoff says
Just one more comment on Camelia’s comment:
[quote]
technically such counts exist but they explode exponentially as a function of the number of candidates)
[/quote]
Incorrect.
There are some rank-balloting voting systems for which the count labor can increase exponentially with the number of candidates. IRV isn’t one of them. Neither are Benham or Woodall. I haven’t proposed a method that can have exponentially-increasing count-labor.
With IRV, Benham, and Woodall, the count labor increases in the way that is typical of the more popular rank-methods: It increases moderately as a low-order polynomial function of the number of candidates.
IRV has been used for about a century for government elections, sometimes in large state or national jurisdictions, in a number of countries, handcounted, without problem.
In a previous comment here, I told how machine-balloting and computer-counting (of publicly-imaged, digitally-scanned ballots) can be entirely secure.
Michael Ossipoff