A Improved Condorcet continuation of Ossipoff’s analysis of election method properties and criterion compliance
Properties Part 2: Traditional Unimproved Condorcet Method
Unimproved Condorcet Method: An analysis of properties of traditional unimproved Condorcet voting
How a Progressive Voted Optimally Using Various Election Methods
Michael Ossipoff on How a Progressive Voted Optimally. Ossipoff shows you can use election methods to make your choice
Properties Part 1: Remarkable Properties of Simplest Voting System
Properties of Simplest Voting System: Methods, With Definitions, Properties, Criterion-Compliances, and Some Notable Criterion-Failures
Approval/Score Voting Details: Support for Defecting Faction
What Would be the Worst Scenario Using the Approval and Score Voting Method? A Defecting Faction.
Strategy for Approval and Score Election Methods
Approval and Score Elections: An Organized Way of Thinking About Election Methodologies
A Computer Program For Counting ICT in Pseudocode
Counting ICT in Pseudocode: A Proposal For ICT in Computer Programming Language
New Approval Poll Strategy Based On the First Poll
Michael Ossipoff Examines Strategy Options For DC’s New Approval Poll
Making Best Use of Plurality, Until We Get Better
Author Ossipoff Suggests Using a State Minor Office Election as a Test Election and Making the Best Use of Plurality Voting System Under Current Conditions
Why Approval Soon Homes In on the Voter Median
Voter Median Estimate Strategy and How Approval Soon Finds the Median and Stays There









