Ranked Choice Voting (RCV) is the best choice for free and fair elections and would be more revolutionary than a switch to Approval Voting. RCV has been in use for over a century, because it can be easily handcounted and it doesn’t require any more vote counting than Approval.
A Mutual-Majority (MM) is the majority-size group that all prefer some same set of candidates to all others. That’s their MM-preferred set.
The Mutual-Majority Criterion (MMC) is as follows:
The winner must always come from the MM-preferred set if the members of that MM vote sincerely.
A voter votes sincerely if s/he doesn’t vote an unfelt preference or fail to vote a felt preference that the the rules would allow them to vote for in addition to those that s/he voted.
RCV meets MMC. Few other methods do.
In the United States and most other countries, progressives are the MM. They can’t lose in RCV if they vote sincerely. According to Public Citizen, a big majority prefer the Greens’ progressive policies to those of the Democrats. That MM can’t lose in RCV and RCV has no spoiler problem for the MM.
Additionally, RCV meets Later-No-Harm Criterion. Later-No-Harm (LNHa):
Modifying your ballot so as to vote B over C should never change the winner from A to B, if you prefer A to B, & vote sincerely.
A certain particular ballot votes B over C if & only if the following is true:
If we throw out all of the ballots except for that one, & we remove from the count all candidates other than B & C, then B wins.
Additionally RCV has no chicken-dilemma, another problem for many voting systems.
None of these things can be said for Approval. Mutual-Majority Criterion, Later-No-Harm Criterion and the chicken-dilemma are all problems with voting systems that can be avoided with RCV.
RCV is the only alternative voting system that has been sweeping the country, enacted in many municipalities including state and national elections. Two states currently utilize RCV.
In summary, RCV meets MMC & LNHa, and has no Chicken-Dilemma. Approval and even STAR voting methods both fail MMC, LNHa, and both have Chicken-Dilemma.
Support it.
Robert Bristow-Johnson says
The problem with marginal improvements is that their promoters entrench their marginal improvement so deeply that this improvement can never be improved upon.
That’s essentially the problem with FPTP in comparison with non-democracy. They say “FPTP is so much better than a monarchy or dictatorship or other authoritarian government” and ignore the Duverger effect that drives this “democracy” into a duopoly of power.
But IRV promoters (which now you are one, Michael) ignore failures of IRV that we know about and just continue to push IRV without acknowledging these failures which prevents learning from the failures and making the necessary reform to correct them.
You’re not learning the lessons from Burlington 2009 nor from Alaska August 2022. In denying those failures, your entrenching this flawed RCV method (and “RCV” is *not* synonymous with IRV) and preventing the adoption of better, more correct RCV methods.
I remember all these Republicans declaring how Trump would be so terrible for both the GOP and for the United States, and now they’re singing the praises of Trump. They just cannot learn to accept the truth about the situation and they yield to the popular wind.
Michael Ossipoff says
Robert says:
[quote]
You’re not learning the lesson’s from Burlington 2009 or Alaska August 2022. In denying those failures…..
[/quote]
RCV didn’t fail in Burlington or Alaska.
Evidently Robert forgot to read the article about which he’s commenting, or he needs to take a look at what happened in those two elections.
…because, in those two elections, RCV did exactly what the article guaranteed it would always do:
It elected from the Mutually-Preferred-Set of the Mutual-Majority.
I forgive Robert for not understanding that. This isn’t a subject that someone like that can spout-off about without reading.
Burlington & Alaska were just two examples of RCV doing as I guaranteed.
A few abbreviations:
MM: Mutual-Majority
MPS: Mutually-Preferred-Set
sCW; Sincere Condorcet-Winner.
The sCW is the candidate who, for each one of the other candidates, is preferred to hir by more voters than vice-versa.
The sCW is always a member of the MM’s MPS.
As I said, RCV always elects from that MPS. Often or usually the sCW, but not necessarily:
If the sCW has fewest votes, s/he’s eliminated in RCV, which choose the which MPS-member wins.
The good Condorcet methods….RP(wv) & MinMax(wv)….are good at electing the sCW, & usually do so.
So, when sCW has fewest votes which MPS-member should win?
Let the MM choose which of THEIR MPS-members wins (….& that isn’t gonna be the very most unfavorite candidate)?
Or let the losing-wing elect the best MPS-member for THEM…the sCW. (a generous & unnecessary compromise that Condorcet gives to the losing wing)?
RCV does the former. Condor does the latter.
Which is better? Well, who other than the MM should choose among their MPS?
The progressives are the MM. Maybe that’s why they like RCV so much.
…& if you’re reasonably sure that you’re in the MM, then why would you want other than the MM’s choice among the MPS? Choose RCV.
But, if you don’t know if you’re in the MM, & if the sCW is a progressive, then you might want to reliably get that compromise, by reliably electing sCW…via Condorcet.
As I said in the article, Public-Citizen’s report shows that big majorities prefer progressive policies: THE PROGRESSIVES ARE THE MM..
So from the progressive standpoint, RCV chooses better, when it chooses farther in the MM’s direction. Obviously a a majority, most people, want what’s best for most people.
Ok, but protecting everyone (including people who don’t know if they’re in the MM) from the spoiler-problem was my voting-system goal from the start. So, arguably settle for that compromise just in case you might be the one who needs it. That consideration favors Condorcet. Also, election of sCW guaranteeds the stability of not electing someone criticizable by a majority.
I’ve tried to state the cases for RCV vs Condorcet (RP or MinMax).
But it’s moot !! …because Condorcet fast becomes unhandcountable if there are more than a few candidates.
…with the consequent worse count-fraud problem.
That’s completely unacceptable. Condorcet is disqualified.
So, though some might like to eliminate the spoiler-problem for everyone, the best that can be done is to eliminate that problem for the MM…via RCV.
…& RCV is the alternative voting-system with enormous success around the country.
So Robert thinks we should all drop what we’re doing, & debate about the best voting systems for (how many) more decades? …as the mother’s-basement-dwellers have been doing for about 40 years?
..,& BTW the name “RCV” was coined by IRV advocates, & they get to define it.
The basement-theorists say that we must keep debating which method to all get behind.
Someone tell them that nearly everyone who wants to replace fptp are ALREADY all behind the same proposal: RCV. …& it’s been sweeping the country.
Robert Bristow-Johnson says
> RCV didn’t fail in Burlington or Alaska.
> …
> It elected from the Mutually-Preferred-Set of the Mutual-Majority.
Who gives a fuck about that?
In Burlington 2009, 4064 voters marked their ballots that Andy Montroll was preferred over Bob Kiss. 3476 voters marked their ballots to the contrary, yet Bob Kiss was elected. The 3476 voters for Kiss had cast ballots that were more effective than the 4064 voters that cast ballots preferring Montroll. Since 3476<4064, that means that the 3476 voters cast votes that effectively each counted more than the votes cast by the 4096.
This resulted in a spoiled election. Had the loser in the final round (Kurt Wright) not run, then Montroll would have defeated Kiss in the IRV final round.
Same for Alaska. Different names and larger number but the same exact failure.
Michaei Ossipoff says
Robert is again repeating, like a parrot, 🦜 his usual dogma.
…repeating things that I’ve already answered a few times.
I don’t have time to keep answer his repetition.
No more replies to Robert.
Michael Ossipoff says
Just to clarify:
If:
1. Condorcet didn’t have its count-fraud problem…
&
2. The progressives hadn’t already made a virtually unanimous choice, all united behind one proposal, & given it enormous national success…
…then I’d probably choose Condorcet, just out of caution, trading the progressives’ majority advantage for the compromise that gets rid off of the Spoiler-problem fu***everyone***.
But both of those two “If conditions are counter factual.
There’s nothing to debate or decide. What the progressives have already unanimously chosen is also the only choice.
.,,&, as I said:
Most of the people want what’s best for most people.
…& therefore it’s best to give full power to that majority. …including the choice among the MM’’s Mutually-Preferred-Set. Let the win transfer in the direction most people want.
Greg Wasleski says
A Condorcet voting method will elect the candidate who beats all other candidates one on one, if such a candidate exists. This is fair.
There are a lot of election method criteria. They all speak to fairness, but none more directly than the Condorcet criterion.
Yes, Condorcet requires electronic calculations, but the vote tabulations only require a small amount of simple code. Vote count transparency is possible. Hand counts to check the voting machines are also possible, if tedious. It would be impractical to hand-check every machine.
Did the Republicans who voted for Nick Begich and the Democrats who voted for Mary Peltola think of themselves as a Mutual-Majority?
Ranked Choice Voting has some momentum, but it is not sweeping the nation. Republicans are dead set against it because of 2022 Alaskan special election. Progressives may lose faith when a Democrat “Condorcet winner” loses an RCV election.
For a deeper RCV dive, try “How Ranked Choice Voting Works and Where It Breaks Down” at https://voters.army/how-ranked-choice-voting-works/.
For a simple (less complex than RCV) Condorcet method, check out BTR-Score at https://voters.army/btr-score-voting/. In elections with no Condorcet winner (rare if there are more than 10,000 voters) BTR-Score will elect a deserving winner transparently.