Zimbabwe is one of very few democracies in the world that don’t register political parties and regulate private funding of political parties and candidates. Most countries have laws that make it mandatory.
Popular Zimbabwean movements seem to understand the difficulty of mobilizing disaffected citizens outside of the channels established by the parties and labour unions that dominate politics.
It had been difficult to forecast how transformational South Africa’s presidency would be 25 years after independence. When South Africans go to the polls tomorrow, the mood will be very different.
The old men who dominate so many of these countries suddenly look their age, and the distance between the rulers and the vast majorities of their populations born 40 or 50 or 60 years after them has never been greater.
We’ve been trapped in a cycle of ever-escalating political polarization in Zimbabwe. As measured by consistent partisan positioning among voters, the split in the Zimbabwe’s electorate has reached the apex. But this is about to end.
Very few details have emerged about the coup, as the government has tried to keep a tight lid on information. What we do know, however, raises a great number of suspicions.
The economic crisis has its origin in pre-existing pathologies inside the political system over the last three decades so that a true recovery will require much more than wise economic management.
The Zimbabwe ConCourt decision to uphold Mnangagwa’s 30 July 2018 presidential election victory challenged by leading contender, Nelson Chamisa, has led to the question: ‘was the court partisan’?
Coupled with the unusually fraught political tension in the election run-up, this recent violence is cause for concern. Addressing these issues now could be vital in preventing violence in the future.
When the coup is reconciled with historic civil-military relations and the events immediately preceding the coup, what emerges is military action in Zimbabwe in 2017 that further weakened the country’s already frail democracy.